Technology presented in the paper [1] 
Introduction
The explosive growth of varieties of Internet and Intranet applications has driven technology development rapidly. New release and new version of software are typically rolled out every six months. Some very large and complex systems, such as telecom systems, must and typically do exhibit exceptional dependability. These systems are seldom totally replaced with a new system because of the increased likelihood of a lapse in service. Rather, systems are upgraded incrementally while operational, albeit this often involves large-scale software changes. It is especially important then to ensure that new or replacement components are ready for on-line installation before they are incorporated into an operational system. The method presented in [1] is able to validate the fitness of such component upgrade before it actually takes place. The method includes two major steps: model derivation and model validation.
The validation method was applied to a wireless monitoring system. The system collects network data such as delay, jitter and packet loss to deduce the voice quality of a VoIP application on the network. Such a monitor informs wireless users of network failures and their corresponding network status data disregard the time and their location. It releases network managers from sitting in their office for long hours. A set of behavioral flows or usage scenarios was first defined. The first scenario is that the network manager as a wireless user should be notified of any network failures anywhere and anytime. The second scenario is that the manager should be given access to other network information after he receives the failure notifications.
After flow analysis, an architectural design of the software system was obtained. Later on, a first version of the system was implemented and the functional flows were demonstrated. Afterwards, new kind of wireless devices and more robust data collection and failure detection methods were proposed and implemented. The wireless monitoring system need to be upgraded to include these upgraded components. It was decided to apply the method in [1] to first validate the feasibility of upgrading the system to its second version and then carry out the actual upgrade. The approach has two advantages. First, pre-upgrade validation provided confidence needed to insure high dependability and continuous wireless monitoring. It is better than ad-hoc upgrade without validation. Second, its results can be used to prove the correctness of the validation method in [1] or to improve the validation method if necessary.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model construction for the wireless monitoring system. Section 3 validates the feasibility of the component upgrades. Section 4 presents the actual upgrade of the wireless monitoring system to its second version. And Section 5 concludes that the validation and actual upgrade results are consistent.
Model Construction
The model construction starts from the scenario flows. First, the two flows are represented in an ArchFlow [1] Step" indicates the sequence of the flow. "Entities" includes the components involved in the flow step. And "Action" describes the flow step.
Step Entities Action Initially, a partial architectural diagram was drawn. Based on the original idea of using wireless device for network fault monitoring, two networks, wireless and wired ones, the gateway between them, and a networkfault monitoring component were decided to be initial components. Figure 1 gives a partial architectural diagram at the initial design.
We ran the model constructor as described in [1] The actual tool-generated architecture model is given in an SDL-like syntax and semantics. A more formal architecture of the wireless monitoring system is given in Figure 3 . Note that the messages on each channel and the process symbols are not shown in SDL syntax. The number on the edge indicates the sequence of the message interaction. The callouts of the edges represents the protocols used in the communication between components and the transmission content is given in brackets next to the protocol names. Each component in the system is represented as one SDL block reflecting the fact that the communication delay is sometimes non-negligible. 
Upgrade Validation
The most commonly changed components of Figure 2 is the type of the mobile network, 2G, 2.5G or 3G devices, and the Fault Monitor (upgraded to become Failure Detector, FD) that has new releases every six months because of new failures types generated from new network applications such as VoIP with new features.
The semi-automatic generated architecture model was used to simulate and analyze the feasibility of every system upgrade. In this case study, the upgrades of the mobile client device type and the FM functions/features are used as a concrete example.
The architecture is modeled as a communicating extended finite state machine (CEFSM) system. Each component is modeled as an extended finite state machine (EFSM) representing the combination of behaviors from the scenario flows, execution activation signals and the original component definitions. A CEFSM model is often defined as a tuple: CEFSM = (EFSM, Channel), including a set of EFSMs and a set of channels. Each EFSM is defined as a finite state machine (FSM) with the addition of variables to its states. An EFSM is a quintuple, i.e., EFSM = (S, S0, I, O, T), where S is the set of states each of which includes its name and a set of variables, S0 is the states, <u1, u2,..., un> and <u1', u2',. .., un'> are the values of extended variables, n is the number of variables, "+" means coexistence, ";" means sequence of events such as tasks and outputs, "*" means repetition, and "[ , ]" denotes a sequenced pair. Each channel consists of three elements: a source device, a destination device, and a signal list, which is a name list of signals that can be sent through the channel. On the system level, the effect of flows can be seen in the addition of new channels that carry flow steps activation signals. In our example, we do not have broadcasting or non-FIFO type of signals.
The CEFSM model is represented in SDL. The high level SDL specification includes a set of EFSMs communicating through channels. There are two types of channels: delaying channels and non-delaying channels. The flow step activation signals are sent through nondelaying channels unless the architecture document states that there is a delay between two steps. The rest of the signals are sent through delaying channels because it is assumed that each EFSM resides at a different physical location. Such physical delay is non-negligible on this architecture abstraction level. Each component is specified in one SDL block with one SDL-Process. The input and output signal sets of an SDL-Process include both the original message communicating between the components and the flow step activation signals.
The behavior of each component and the attributes of each component, such as throughput, failure rate, availability, and price, are given as additional information in the architecture document. They are used to generate automatically environment and attribute simulators. The execution is based on an SDL engine.
The two upgrades to be validated are: 1) to change the browser of the client device from WAP1.1 (Wireless Application Protocol) to WAP1.2[2] compatible; and 2) to upgrade the FM to actively inject traffic into the network to collect data other than proactively monitoring the network. The name of the FM component should also be changed to Failure Detector to reflect its new functions.
We first employ a coverage-based model-checking approach that uses a dynamic slicing technique to guide a subsequent simulation. A conventional model checker verifies all the possible system states. Our method includes four steps:
Step 1: We first identify the "impacted model", i.e. the first upgrade includes wireless client and WG and the second includes FM, WCG and PI.
Step 2: We used a slicing technique to discover the most critical part of the impacted model to validate based on its contribution to overall simulation coverage. The communication between wireless client and the WG for the first upgrade and the transition in FM with the highest count of the second upgrade are identified as the critical points of the model.
Step 3: We manually generate simulation test cases to cover the critical parts of the model, i.e., the communication between client and WG and some EFSM transitions of FM.
Step 4: After each simulation, the overall achieved test coverage percentage for the model was updated.
Next, we investigate an operational-profile-based approach for predicting overall system properties. Again, we use the specification-level dynamic slicing technique that relies on the execution of the specification to obtain simulation traces for the specification. Traces record the coverage repetition of basic transitions, i.e., how many times the same basic transition has been simulated. From this basic transition coverage, we can deduce the following five kinds of coverage: 1) basic transition coverage itself, 2) symbolic state coverage, 3) decision coverage, 4) component coverage, and 5) variable value coverage.
The operational profile provides us with data on the realistic usage of the target system. They can be used to guide the simulation of the model to determine the relative frequency of use for the various components or channels during typical operations. These usage frequencies indicate the relative contributions to certain system properties.
Lastly, we validate the behavior of the upgraded system to assist in the generation of a upgrade plan. In the underlying operational system, each EFSM has one InputPort that contains a FIFO queue of signals. The delay on channels is nondeterministic. They can be modeled as a queue where the departure of an element from a queue occurs at a random time. This queue is stored in the Path processor of the underlying SDL machine.
When the simulator receives a copy of the same input as the target system, it stamps the current time onto the input signal, and then gives it to the System processor. The System will decide whether to deliver it to the Path or the Input-Port. Signals will eventually be delivered to the destination SDL-Process. When an SDL-Process encounters nondeterminism, it will inform the System to duplicate a similar copy of itself carrying different behavioral belief. When the System Processor of the underlying SDL machine notices that there is no active SDL-Process at a certain moment, it checks through all the Input-Ports of the SDL-Processes. It picks up a signal with a smallest stamped time, sends it to the SDL-Process for processing, and updates the global timer to the time carried on the signal time stamp. Note that the signals in Input-Ports are arranged in descending sequence according to their time stamps.
Experiments were carried out using the simulator derived to assess behavior of the software architectural design. The experimental result shows that the information generated by the simulator can be used to validate the behavior and the attributes of an upgraded system solely based on its architecture documents.
For the first wireless client upgrade, one of the tests that travel through the communication path between the wireless client and the WG failed. Closer examination reveals that the client uses some WAP1.2 features that are not supported by WAP1.1. It is clear that WAP Gateway component needs also to be upgraded to support WAP1.2. Since protocols are often backward compatible, the original components using WAP1.1 should work properly without upgrades. The upgrade of communication protocol between Mobile Client and WAP Gateway does not interfere with the operation of the entire system as long as the WAP Gateway component rolls over to the new protocol before the client does.
For the second upgrade, all simulation tests have passed. Even thought the change from FM to FD is dramatic, one injecting traffic to the network and the other not, no new communication interfaces or message types are created. FM can directly roll over to FD without interfering with the operation of the entire system.
On-Line Upgrade
The original version of FM monitors the Real-Time Control Protocol (RTCP) traffics between end-to-end points. It uses an E-model [8] to measure the voice quality. The E-model is defined as R=R 0 -I s -I d -I e +A. R 0 represents noise effects. I s is the effects of impairments that occur simultaneously with the voice signal such as a loud connection and a loud side tone. I d encompasses delay effects. I e covers bit rate code and packet loss. And, A is the "access advantage" factor. The difference between VoIP traffic quality and the traditional one is mostly in the delay I d and the distortion I e . Overall, the model implies that the voice quality can be calculated with the measurement of end-to-end delay, packet loss, and jitter (DPJ) that carried on RTCP. The reason why this first version was called fault monitor is that it only passively monitors the end-to-end RTCP traffic without injecting any probing into the network. It cannot predict the anticipated voice quality without an actual call. Figure  4 shows a simplified SDL model of the original fault monitor. It waits for RTCP packets. After it receives a packet, it calculates the voice quality and uses voice quality statistics to detect failures. When it detects a failure, it invokes PI to send out alert messages. The upgrade of FM to Failure Detector (FD) is to actively probing the network to predict voice quality. The upgraded version of the fault monitor is called failure detector. It actively detects and predicts failures even when there is no phone calls going through. It injects ICMP traffic to the network to calculate the DPJ factors of each link other than each end-to-end path. It estimates the end-to-end parameters using the link measurements. When the percentage of bad voice calls reaches a predefined threshold, the IP network is detected as erroneous for voice traffic. An alarm will be generated to alert the network managers of the network performance deterioration. To ensure the timely report of the failures, the alarm is sent to the Push Initiator to be forwarded to the network managers carrying mobile device. Figure 5 presents the simplified SDL model of FD. It sets a timer to periodically send out ICMP packets. When it receives an ICMP response packet, it derives DPJ factors and voice quality of all available paths. Based on the calculation, it then sends failure notification if any. As it can be seen, even thought the SDL models for FM and FD look quite different. However, the communication to Our upgrade plan includes four sequenced steps: 1) to change WAP stack in WG to support WAP1.2, 2) to upgrade the wireless client to WAP1.2, 3) to switch on the FD and collect it to the architecture setting, and 4) to turn off the original FM.
During the course of upgrade, we purposely inject failures to the network to see whether the system can continuously detect failures, i.e., no service interruption during the upgrade. The monitor was able to detect failures in all 250 experimental runs (25 runs for each fault category, 10 fault categories). A subset of the data collected for the experiments of the first category faults are given in Table 1 . The "CP seed" is the seeds used to select the network link to be jammed with traffic and the traversal of the link being the failure to be detected. The "load seed" is the seed used to generate Poisson distribution phone call traffic for the load generator. The "alter edge" is the edge chosen to be jammed with injected traffic. The table shows that there is a small delay between the failure detection time and failure occurrence time. The result is identical to the result when there is no concurrent on-line upgrade. The upgrade did not interfere with the continue system operation and system dependability. 
Conclusions
This paper presents a case study of applying the method in [1] to validate the dependability of on-line component upgrade. Although the example application is wireless network software, the projected results would be suitable for software systems in general, especially realtime systems requiring high availability.
In our experiments, we found the tools developed by [1] being useful. It helped to generate formal models to decide quickly whether a candidate component is a suitable upgrade. It also assisted us in generating a dependable upgrade plan. In all, these tools reduce the cost of component-based software modifications, because a go/no-go decision at the design stage may avoid the high cost associated with installing unsuitable components. The result of our actual component upgrade is consistent with the validation of the method in [1] . Both predict a successful upgrade.
For the on-line upgrading activity, the experiments were carried out under normal network conditions. One possible future work is to test the method on more extreme conditions such as multiple simultaneous voice calls. For mobile notification, the future upgrade includes allowing network managers to make direct calls to the technicians who are available in the geographical area that fault occurs and with the best-suited skills to fix the network failure. One future work is to find an upgrade case that is proven to be faulty by the validation method, and run an actual upgrade to see whether the validation result is correct.
